10 بهمن 1400
30 ژانویه 2022
برخی منابع مورد استفاده:
Russia thinks in terms of firepower and facts on the ground. Putin has spent the past dozen years turning Russia’s armed forces into a well-armed, efficient instrument (it took less than 24 hours to put Russia’s 6th Airborne into Kazakhstan and just three days to kill everyone who didn’t like it). He’s lurked in the tall grass waiting for an opportunity to settle accounts.
Had the current president maintained Trump’s deterrence, the Ukraine fiasco might have never happened
روزنامه شرق شنبه 9 بهمن
چرا اوکراین مهم است؟
فرانسیس فوکویاما (فیلسوف سیاسی و نظریه پرداز)
منبع: American Purpose
اوکراین یک دموکراسی لیبرال واقعی است
این دلیل واقعی ولادیمیر پوتین برای حمله به اوکراین است
As a declining power ruled by a single strongman since 2000, Russia under Vladimir Putin has had a weak hand to play. Putin’s aggressive foreign policy actions have been motivated primarily by the need to bolster his domestic standing, not to enhance Russian security.
America Doesn’t Need to Fight Russia in Ukraine to Save Taiwan from China
Diverting resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific to meet a lesser threat will not help reassure allies and partners in the region where the United States will face its greatest security challenges over the next decade.
Germany’s refusal to provide military assistance to Ukraine has baffled many of its European and NATO allies. If Berlin does not adopt a bolder, unambiguous stance toward Russia, it will undermine the West’s deterrence efforts.
it’s no secret that he’s bitter about the loss of Russia’s Soviet empire, which he once called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Many veteran Russia-watchers believe his goal is to reverse that history — to the degree possible — by bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold, an aim he’s already achieved with Belarus. Such a course would remove the possibility that Ukraine could join either the EU or NATO, which Putin regards as a threat to his own hold on power, and reestablish a significant buffer between Russia proper and the Western alliance.
The West has despised Russia for too long
Zhang Hong on HuangJu.com China
On the one hand, the West regards the absorption of Warsaw Pact members by NATO and the European Union as the disappearance of the Cold War legacy, and on the other hand, the absorption of the post-Soviet region by the Western political, economic and security system is seen as consolidating the achievements of the Cold War.
"We really don't want to burn bridges, but if someone perceives our good intentions as indifference or weakness, and he himself intends to finally burn or even blow up these bridges, then he should know that Russia's response will be asymmetric, quick and tough."
The 44-year history of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union proved that absolute security cannot be achieved simply by building up weapons, and unilateral security is an unreliable world. The cold war mentality and zero-sum game can only add big new risks to this volatile situation. The recent security crisis in the areas adjacent to Ukraine is not just a problem of NATO expansion, it is a crisis of international security mechanisms provoked by the United States and the West, as well as to some extent a crisis of global governance.
NATO is now a trap for Germany, compelling Germany to cooperate on the one thing it did not want to do: prepare for a potential war. It has refused to send weapons to Ukraine, putting it at odds with the U.S. and Britain. It cannot afford to risk its economic relationship with Russia. Every time Germany tries to escape history, history pulls it back in.
For Germany, life after World War II, but especially after the Cold War, was about economics. It achieved through the EU what it couldn’t achieve since 1871: domination of Europe. And it did so without the kind of violence that had ripped the Continent apart for centuries.
That may no longer be the case. Russia, less powerful than before but powerful still, is reclaiming lands in its supposed sphere of influence. The U.S. is once again on the defensive. NATO still exists, and Germany is part of it. Germany is thus essential in the Ukraine affair. Economic power, economic needs, fear of war and fear of what peace would look like tear at the Germans.
Germany had hoped that its past could be forgotten. But in this confrontation, the German question is vital. How Berlin answers that question – or how others try to answer it – will once again reshape Germany and Europe. Germany may not like it, but the question has been around since the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Nations don’t get to select what questions are put to them.
Ukraine is a problem for Putin’s Russia not because it may join NATO, but because it is democratizing—slowly, awkwardly, imperfectly—and after 30 years of independence is constructing a new national identity. So, too, have the other former Soviet republics, a number of which (Azerbaijan, for example) have quietly sided with Kyiv. The aim of reconstructing if not the Russian empire, then a 21st-century version of it, is slipping out of Putin’s grip, and he knows it. In many ways, what we’re seeing now from Moscow is a spasm of atavistic postimperial assertion, which, rather like British and French intervention in Egypt in 1956, may begin well but will probably end poorly.
Brennan Deveraux is a major in the U.S. Army
The return of theater-support missiles, brought on by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’s demise, challenges Russia’s security and undoubtedly influences the country’s decision-making. Since the treaty’s end, Russia’s actions have sent a clear message that it would not let intermediate-range missiles reemerge in Europe. However, the response from the West not only failed to address Russia’s concerns but treated the reintegration of these missiles as a foregone conclusion, focusing almost exclusively on the relative advantage that their deployment could provide to the United States and NATO. While NATO expansion may very well be the primary driver of Russia’s actions toward Ukraine, the return of these strategic missiles is also a factor that the United States should consider.
while all members of the Bolshevik Central Committee which plotted and executed the seizure of power in Petrograd in 1917 had been born into the Russian Empire, only two were ethnic Russians (Lenin and Bubnov); the remainder were Jews – certainly not considered “Russians” at the time – (Zinoviev, Kamenev-Rosenfeld, Sokolnikov-Brillyant, Trotskiy-Bronshteyn) and Lenin’s “miraculous Georgian”, Stalin-Jughashvili
Native communists and their involvement in Bolshevism are airbrushed out of the picture. Gone from the new picture are Latsis and Peters, Derzhinskiy and Orjonikidze; gone are Kossior and Zhdanov; Sultan-Galiyev, Narimanov and Vakhitov are airbrushed out; Vares and Snieckus are gone. In their place is erected a narrative of Russians imposing Russian-invented communism on innocent nations.
They were the most reliable and effective military force in the Bolshevik ranks. The Red Latvian Riflemen not only helped preserve Soviet power in the Russian Civil War, but even saved Lenin himself on more than one occasion.
The time to have deployed 50,000 troops to Europe was in 2008, after the Russian-Georgian War, or 2014, after the Crimea crisis. Having 50,000 well-armed US troops refocused on the difficult task of fighting a sustained ground conflict in Europe might have forced Russia to reconsider its options. By considering this option now, all Biden is doing is proving the point that the US is a failing superpower, and NATO is lacking both purpose and drive.
What a difference three decades makes. In 1990, the US Army in Europe (USAREUR) consisted of some 213,000 combat-ready forces organized into two Corps – V and VII – a Berlin Brigade, and the 3d Brigade of the 2d Armored Division, deployed in northern Germany to protect the port of Hamburg. Each corps consisted of one infantry division, one armored division, and an armored cavalry regiment.
These forces would fall in on prepositioned military stores warehoused and maintained to a level of constant readiness. Between the forces in Europe and those earmarked for deployment, USAREUR boasted a total combat capacity of over 550,000 troops which helped maintain the peace during America’s long Cold War with the Soviet Union, which had around 600,000 troops stationed in eastern Europe, including 338,000 in East Germany alone.
The Russian Army defeated a Chechen insurgency in the Second Chechen War (something the US military and NATO were unable to accomplish in 20 years in Afghanistan) and performed well in both the Georgian-Russian War of 2008 and the Crimea operation in 2014. Moreover, largely in response to the eastward expansion of NATO, Russia reformed two Cold War-era military formations – the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 20th Combined Arms Army – which specialized in the very kind of mobile, large-scale combined arms operations the US military and NATO have forgotten how to fight.
In 1988 – a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall – the West German Army was looking at a reorganization scheme that would retain its structure of 12 divisions with 48 brigades, but reduce the manning levels from 95% to a ‘cadre structure’ of only 50%-70% that could be brought to full strength only through the mobilization of reserves.
By 2020, the German Army, by now representing a unified country, had been reduced to little more than 60,000 troops organized into two armored divisions of six brigades, and one rapid deployment division of two brigades. But even this reduced figure is misleading – to deploy a combat-capable battalion-sized armored force to the Baltics as part of NATO’s ‘battlegroup’ concept, Germany has to cannibalize its existing armor force. Germany today is incapable of rapidly deploying a single armored brigade from its barracks.
In 1988 the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR, representing the United Kingdom’s NATO contingent in Europe) consisted of some 55,000 troops organized into a single armored corps consisting of three armored divisions with eight brigades and supporting units. By 2021, this had dropped to just 72,500 troops in the entire British military, with no troops in mainland Europe. Moreover, the British are only capable of fielding two armored brigades, only one of which is capable of projecting power in any meaningful capacity onto European soil in short notice.