بهمن شفیق
۴ دی ۱۴۰۳
۲۳ ژانویه ۲۰۲۵
https://ria.ru/20250116/netanyakhu-1993895196.html
As one writer wrote in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz:"Even if we occupy the entire Middle East and even if everyone surrenders to us, we will not defeat Gaza." After all, Netanyahu's real goal was not to retaliate for the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, not to destroy its structure or release hostages. The main task was to eliminate Gaza as such. The residents had to be so intimidated that they were willing to go anywhere. In extreme cases, they could be grouped into parts of the sector, separating the northern territory from it. The will to resist had to be completely broken, and Israel would then allow representatives of Arab countries to enter the rest of Gaza, who would take over the reconstruction of Gaza, which would generally remain under Israeli control and control.
… As the Israeli press writes: "We are the first to pay the price for the election of Trump. We are being raped into accepting the deal. And we expected that we would control the north of Gaza and not allow humanitarian aid."
The agreement is called "shameful and vile", and the leader of the ultra-chauvinists, Minister Ben Gvir, generally called it a "surrender deal". The radicals can now leave the government — and then Netanyahu will go to early elections. By trying to sell himself to the Israelis as a "winner", but his Pyrrhic victory in Gaza will cost Israel dearly.
Sara Roy
طبقات در فلسطین
Taha
During the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinians were transformed into low-wage laborers serving Israeli economic interests. Scholars have described the importance of proletarianization to settler colonialism in the context of Israel/Palestine precisely due to its peculiar feature of replacing, rather than merely exploiting, Palestinian labor (Samed 1976).
Davar, the daily newspaper concerned with Jewish labor, demonstrates this bluntly: “it is almost impossible to fire an Israeli worker or to relocate him without his permission and without a wage increase. On the other hand, an Arab worker is exceptionally mobile, can be dismissed without notice and moved from place to place, does not strike and does not present demands” (Samed 1976, 160) As a latent reserve army of unemployed (Marx 1976), Palestinian labor was utilized as an indirect tool to threaten the lowest strata of Israeli working class, and suppress their bargaining power.
بیکاری
بورژوازی فلسطینی
As for the large capitalist bourgeoisie, most had fled Palestine slightly before the war in 1948, or immediately afterward. They moved their capital to neighboring Arab and gulf countries. The remaining capitalists accounted for a small segment of society: the category of “employers” in labor force surveys fluctuated between 2–5% during the 1967–1993 period.
کارگران فلسطینی در اسرائیل
شاخههای مختلف فعالیت
کاهش بخش کشاورزی، روند پرولتریزه شدن
کشاورزی پس از پیمان اسلو
طبقه متوسط و کارگران
سهم تولید ناخالص داخلی فلسطین نسبت به اقتصاد کل اسرائیل ۱۹۶۸-۲۰۱۸
سهم کرانه باختری (خاکستری روشن) و نوار غزه (خاکستری تیره) در تولید ناخالص داخلی اسرائیل
تنها دوره رشد ناچیز بعد از پیمان اسلو ۱۹۹۷-۲۰۰۰
In its famous report “Twenty-Seven Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis,” the World Bank summarized the extremely complex and multifaceted damage inflicted on the Palestinian economy by the Israeli military as a “35% decline in GDP” between 1999 and 2002, as if that fact is more telling than the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of fruit trees (World Bank 2003, xii).
شکاف دستمزدی
سهم به ترتیب از بالا به پائین: یهودیان اشکنازی، یهودیان میزراحی،
فلسطینیان شهروند اسرائیل، کارگران فلسطینی در اسرائیل، کرانه باختری، نواز غزه
ILO گزارش سازمان جهانی کار:
The average daily wage for workers in the OPT registered 128.6 NIS in 2019, with large differences between workers in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. As the PCBS (2019) data indicate, the average wage of workers in Israel is double the wage of workers in the West Bank and four times the wage of workers in Gaza. The average wage of workers in Gaza is 51% of that in the West Bank (PCBS, LFS, 2019)
As of 2019, 71% of Palestinian workers were wage employees. This percentage is particularly high and
indicates the significant dependence of workers on wages both from the private and public sectors.
Employers on the other hand accounted for only 6.5% of the working population in the OPT, suggesting a significant pressure imposed on this segment in case of a further lockdown. The self-employed accounted for 18% of workers, a category devastated by the lockdown, as will be explained later (PCBS, LFS, 2019).
At the same time, and as of 2019, workers in informal employment constituted 57% of the total workers in the OPT, of whom 59% were in the West Bank, and 51% in the Gaza Strip. This implies a high share of unprotected workers who are at a higher risk of economic hardship in light of the limited income security that they have. (PCBS, 2020c).
Looking closely at wage employees, 2019 data indicate that 30% of wage employees working in the private sector received less than the monthly minimum wage of 1,450 NIS ($400), with a share of 29% among men and 35% among women. This means that any loss or reduction in these meagre wages will be dramatic for this low-paid group of workers, with a severe impact on women, whose wages tend to be lower than those of men. Equally worrisome is the group of workers working without an employment contract and who constitute 48% of wage employees in the private sector. These workers are less likely to receive any form of support from the government and are particularly vulnerable to being laid off or having their salaries reduced by their employers (PCBS, LFS, 2019).
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