بهمن شفیق

۲۵ مهر۱۴۰۴

۱۹ اکتبر ۲۰۲۵

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatoly_Chubais

Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Relations with International Organisations to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals  4 December 2020 – 22 March 2022

Deputy Prime Minister of Russia 1 June 1992 – 5 November 1994

Prime Minister            Yegor Gaidar (acting)

Viktor Chernomyrdin

Balance of Terror

https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP192.html

Requirements for a Nuclear Deterrent Force

First, a fully deployed nuclear force should be able to survive a first strike designed to prevent that force from striking back.

Second, the delivery systems must be able to reach their targets and to penetrate defenses on their way to the target. Being able to reach the target was an obvious problem in the Cold War, when intercontinental distances separated the combatants.

Third, the force should have a low risk of physical accidents, a problem even the United States has encountered. Aircraft carrying nuclear weapons have crashed.

Fourth, the nuclear weapons should be safe against theft or unauthorized use. This threat can originate from either external or internal sources.

Fifth, the force should have a low risk of mistaken use by authorized persons. Such use might occur as a result of faulty warning of an attack or in response to an attack from a wrongly identified country or from a subnational group.

Sixth, the command authorities must survive any first strike, be able to make the decision to retaliate, and be able to communicate this decision to the surviving nuclear forces. U.S. law has specified 17 office holders as presidential successors[5] to ensure that there will always be someone authorized and available to make the decision to use nuclear weapons.

Seventh, the nuclear forces should be capable of a number of response options.

Finally, the force must be procured and operated at a reasonable cost. What is "reasonable" is relative, depending on the defense spending in any particular country.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html

Albert Wohlstetter 1958:

we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the growth of a significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless attack. As a result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960's we may not have the power to deter attack.

Pakistan

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/pakistan/nuke/aqkhan020404.html

https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan_memo.html

North Korea

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/04/the-reason-behind-north-koreas-nuclear-program-and-its-offer-to-end-it.html

Imperial Japan occupied Korea from 1905 to 1945 and tried to assimilate it. A nominal communist resistance under Kim Il-sung and others fought against the Japanese occupation. After the Japanese WWII surrender in 1945 the U.S. controlled and occupied the mostly agricultural parts of Korea below the arbitrarily chosen 38th parallel line. The allied Soviet Union controlled the industrialized part above the line. They had agreed on a short trusteeship of a united and independent country. In the upcoming cold war the U.S. retracted on the agreement and in 1948 installed a South Korean proxy dictatorship under Syngman Rhee. This manifested an artificial border the Koreans had not asked for and did not want. The communists still commanded a strong and seasoned resistance movement in the south and hoped to reunite the country. The Korea War ensued. It utterly destroyed the country. All of Korea was severely effected but especially the industrialized north which lost about a third of its population and all of its reasonably well developed infrastructure – roads, factories and nearly all of its cities.

https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/12/asia/south-korea-us-military-drill/index.html

South Korea’s defense ministry spokesman is calling the maneuvers “the largest scale ever,” involving 300,000 South Korean troops and at least 17,000 from the U.S.

Small detachments of forces from Australia and New Zealand also participated in Saturday’s operations.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-military-exercise-what-would-it-look-like-if-south-korea-invaded-a6927666.html

Independent, Blitzkrieg

South Korean and US forces stage 'blitzkrieg' simulation of North Korea beach landing

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chronology-us-north-korean-nuclear-and-missile-diplomacy-1985-2022

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

German Foreign Federal Office

Carnegie Corporation of New York

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulchi-Freedom_Guardian

Ulchi Freedom Shield

Origins: The exercise traces its roots to the Taeguk Exercise, which began in 1968 after a North Korean special forces raid. It was renamed the Ulchi Exercise in 1969.

Integration: In 1976, it was integrated with the U.S.-ROK joint exercise Focus Lens, creating the Ulchi-Focus Lens exercise.

Name Change (2008): The name was changed to Ulchi-Freedom Guardian in 2008.

Name Change (2022): The exercise was rebranded as Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) to emphasize the enhanced, all-domain, and interagency nature of the training. This change was made to better reflect the need to counter modern hybrid threats like cyberattacks and drone swarms.

https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4281579/us-south-korea-kick-off-ulchi-freedom-shield-25/

Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 underscores the continuing military partnership between the U.S. and South Korea and is implemented in the spirit of the Oct. 1, 1953, mutual defense treaty. Additionally, the exercise is conducted in support of the Korean Armistice Agreement, fortifying the combined defense posture and enhancing response capabilities.

Ukraine

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ukraine-nuclear-weapons-and-security-assurances-glance

1992 Lisbon Protocol

Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992. The protocol sought to return the nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia. All states were to join START and the NPT.

1994 Trilateral Statement

The Massandra Accords set the stage for the ultimately successful trilateral talks. As the United States mediated between Russia and Ukraine, the three countries signed the Trilateral Statement on January 14, 1994. Ukraine committed to full disarmament, including strategic weapons, in exchange for economic support and security assurances from the United States and Russia.

Costs:

https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/8192/attachments/original/1749739983/ICAN_Spending_Report_Hidden_Costs_final-ExSum.pdf?1749739983

In 2024, the nine nuclear-armed states spent $9.9 billion (11%) more on their nuclear arsenals than the year before, a total of $100.2 billion, or $3,169 per second on nuclear weapons. In the past five years, from 2020- 2024, these countries spent $415.9 billion on their nuclear arsenals.